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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON

______________________________________________________________________________
ISSUE: CONCURRENT JURISDICTION AND PRIMACY
WHAT DO THE CONCEPTS OF “CONCURRENT JURISDICTION” AND “PRIMACY” MEAN CONCRETELY FOR THE
STL AND THE LEBANESE NATIONAL COURTS? WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS ON THE STL AND LEBANESE
AUTHORITIES OF THE DEFERRAL OF THE HARIRI CASE (SEE DEFERRAL ORDER OF 27 MARCH 2009 AND
SUBSEQUENT COMPLIANCE BY THE LEBANESE INVESTIGATING JUDGE) AND/OR THE CONNECTED CASES TO
THE STL PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE STATUTE AND RULE 17 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE? IS DEFERRAL ITSELF AN EXERCISE OF PRIMACY OVER THE INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION? DOES DEFERRAL EQUAL EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE? WHAT ARE THE
LIMITATIONS, IF ANY, OF THE STL’S JURISDICTION? PLEASE BE SURE TO RESEARCH THE HISTORY AND
MEANING OF THESE TERMS IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONALIZED/HYBRID COURTS.

______________________________________________________________________________

Prepared by Helena Traner
J.D. Candidate May 2012
Fall Semester, 2010
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was established at the request of Lebanon by the
United Nations Security Council in order to try those allegedly responsible for the attack that
killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others on February 14, 2005. The
STL is an international tribunal that will apply Lebanese law to bring the perpetrators of this
attack (and other related attacks within its jurisdiction) to justice. In order to effectively carry
out this mandate, the STL was given “concurrent jurisdiction” with the Lebanese national court
system. The STL was also granted “primacy” over the national courts of Lebanon, over matters
falling within its jurisdiction.
On March 27, 2009, the trial chamber of the STL granted the Prosecutor’s application for
a deferral order in the Hariri case, and the Lebanese judge subsequently complied with that
request. This memo examines: (1) What “concurrent jurisdiction” and “primacy” have meant in
the context of other international tribunals and domestic courts and what these terms will mean
in the context of the STL and the Lebanese authorities; (2) what effect a deferral order and
subsequent compliance has on the STL and the Lebanese authorities; whether such a deferral in
and of itself is an exercise of primacy over the investigation and prosecution, and whether such a
deferral grants the STL exclusive jurisdiction; and finally, (3) what limits, if any, there are to the
extent of the STL’s jurisdiction.1

What do the concepts of “concurrent jurisdiction” and “primacy” mean concretely for the STL and the Lebanese
national courts? What are the effects on the STL and Lebanese authorities of the deferral of the Hariri case (see
Deferral Order of 27 March 2009 and subsequent compliance by the Lebanese investigating judge) and/or the
connected cases to the STL pursuant to Article 4 of the Statute and Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence?
Is deferral itself an exercise of primacy over the investigation and prosecution? Does deferral equal exclusive
jurisdiction over the case? What are the limitations, if any, of the STL’s jurisdiction? Please be sure to research the
history and meaning of these terms in the context of internationalized/hybrid courts.
1

1

B. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
(1)

In other international tribunals, “concurrent jurisdiction” and “primacy” have been

interpreted and applied to mean that the international tribunals sit at the “top” of a vertical
jurisdictional hierarchy. Domestic courts must comply with deferral orders and requests issued
by the international tribunals. However, complying with this obligation requires national
governments to have enacted implementing legislation. If Lebanon’s domestic court system
refuses to comply with a deferral order issued by the STL, there is a process by which the matter
may be referred to the United Nations Security Council which may then take action to issue a
binding resolution, compelling Lebanon to comply. Yet this procedure may still prove
insufficient.2 Thus the success of the STL’s primacy is largely dependent on maintaining
vertical cooperation with Lebanon.
(2)

As demonstrated by the experience of the other tribunals, a deferral order issued by the

STL is an attempt to exercise its primacy, and compliance with such an order by a Lebanese
judge is an exercise in submission to the primacy of the jurisdiction of the STL. Once a deferral
order has been issued, Lebanon must assume its duty to cooperate with the STL. Lebanon must
cease prosecution and proceedings against the accused, turn over case files and records, and
transfer the accused. Lebanese authorities may assist the STL in its pre-trial investigations if
authorized or requested by the STL.
(3)

While the STL’s jurisdiction is exclusive in this respect, there are some limitations and

potential policy problems with the STL’s exercise of primacy:

2

See infra note 90 (Like the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the STL has the
ability to refer such matters to the United Nations Security Council. However, the ICTY was never able to take such
action with respect to Serbia due to political reasons).

2

a. State sovereignty issues may present an obstacle to the complete exercise of
jurisdiction and primacy.
b. Non-compliance by Lebanon does not appear to be likely, but may present a
limitation.
c. In the event the STL wishes to refer certain cases back to the national courts of
Lebanon, there is currently no procedural mechanism in its statute by which to do
so. The STL’s exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over the Hariri case may
therefore inhibit the Lebanese authorities’ ability to prosecute in the future.
d. The non bis in idem provision of the STL’s statute may present a significant
obstacle to the exercise of jurisdiction.
1. The STL may not try an individual if he/she has already been tried by
Lebanon (or another state) unless certain conditions are met. This
limitation may be overcome, but will pose significant difficulties with
respect to third party states.
2. As the jurisdiction of the STL may be expanded and subsequent
deferrals order may become necessary, the non bis in idem provision can
be used as an argument in favor of deferral for related attacks or
incidents.
II. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION AND PRIMACY
The relationship between national courts and international ad hoc tribunals such as the
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) have depended upon a system of vertical cooperation, allowing the international
tribunals generally to exercise “concurrent jurisdiction” with national courts, and at the same
3

time exercise “primacy” over specific cases within their jurisdiction. The purpose for
implementing these seemingly contradicting mechanisms in the statutes of international tribunals
is to preserve the sovereignty of the national courts to prosecute crimes within their jurisdiction
while affording international tribunals the opportunity to seize matters crucial to their mandates
(upholding the compelling humanitarian and international peace and security interests) that fall
into the overlap between national and international jurisdiction.3 This tension between national
state sovereignty and primacy of the international tribunals has not been easy to resolve.
Both the ICTY and ICTR were established by the United Nations Security Council,
invoking Chapter VII authority of the United Nations Charter.4 This is significant as it thereby
places a binding legal obligation on states to comply with the requests and orders of these
tribunals.5 However, the primacy of the ICTY over the national courts was the subject of debate
during the adoption of its statute, and some permanent members indicated that the ICTY’s
exercise of primacy was intended to be limited in scope to situations of non bis in idem;
situations where an accused has already been tried at the national level.6 In practice, primacy
expanded and became a useful tool for the international prosecutors to petition for requests for
3

Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal
Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869, 882–83 (2002) [Reproduced at Tab 17].
4

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc S/RES/827
(May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute] [Reproduced at Tab 29]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute] [Reproduced at Tab 30].
5

UN Charter, Article 41 [Reproduced at Tab 2]; Dagmar Stroh, State Cooperation with the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 249, 253 (2001) [Reproduced at
Tab 18].
6

U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at 11, 16, 18–19, 46, U.N. Doc S/PV.3217 (1993) (France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States all made statements suggesting that, in their view, the exercise of primacy was to be
limited in scope to overcoming situations of non bis in idem. The President of the Security Council (Russian
Federation) also noted, “As we understand it, the provisions of Article 9, paragraph 2, denote the duty of a state to
give very serious consideration to a request by the Tribunal to refer to it a case that is being considered in a national
court. But this is not a duty automatically to refer the proceedings to the Tribunal on such a matter. A refusal to refer
the case naturally has to be justified. We take it that this provision will be reflected in the rules of procedure and the
rules of evidence of the Tribunal.”) [Reproduced at Tab 35].

4

deferral at various stages of proceedings, pursuant to newly adopted rules of procedure and
evidence.7 These requests were issued to both the national courts within the territory of the
former Yugoslavia, and to judicial authorities of other states. While under a duty to comply with
such requests, not all national courts immediately followed their legal obligation to do so.8
Whether due to the pressing attendant circumstance of compelling humanitarian
concerns, or due to a growing acceptance of the idea of primacy, the ICTR’s statute expanded
primacy further than that of the ICTY.9 When the creation of International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda was considered, it was suggested that language be included in its statute such that, “any
judicial proceedings which revealed any link whatsoever with crimes committed in Rwanda
should be halted by the national court and referred to the International Tribunal for Rwanda.”10
For example, Zaire expressed a concern that, “the primacy of the International Tribunal is not
guaranteed, since to recognize a competence concurrent to both jurisdictions is tantamount to
recognizing that the first to be notified of a case must carry that case to judgment.”11 While this
7

Rules of Procedure and Evidence at Rules 9-12; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-95-1-AR72, Decision on
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadic Appeal] [Reproduced at
Tab 4]; Prosecutor v. Mrksic, et. al, Case No. IT-95-13-R61, Decision on the Proposal of the Prosecutor for a
Request to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to Defer the Pending Investigations and
Criminal Proceedings to the Tribunal (Dec. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Mrksic][Reproduced at Tab 5]; In Re: The
Republic of Macedonia, Case No. IT-02-55-MISC.6, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Deferral and Motion for
Order to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Oct. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Macedonia Request for
Deferral][Reproduced at Tab 6]; Lasva River Valley, Case No. IT-95-6-D, Decision on the Matter of a Proposal for a
Formal Request for Deferral to the Competence of the International Tribunal Addressed to the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (May 11, 1995) [hereinafter Lasva River Valley] [Reproduced at Tab 8].
8

See, e.g., Mrksic, supra note 7 (Serbia and Montenegro refusing to comply with a deferral order) [Reproduced at
Tab 5].
See Mohamed M. El Zeidy, supra note 3, at 885 (arguing the expansion of the ICTR’s primacy was due to outside
pressures) [Reproduced at Tab 17] contra Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the
Jurisdiction of National Courts and the International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 402 (1998)
(claiming the use of “primacy over the national courts of all states” in the Statute of the ICTR reflects a trend toward
consensus on expansion) [Reproduced at Tab 24].
9

Letter dated 7 November 1994 from the Chargè d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Zaire to the United
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1267 [Reproduced at Tab 41].
10

11

Id. [Reproduced at Tab 41].
5

language was not eventually adopted, the language of the ICTR Statute was altered to read, “the
International Tribunal shall have primacy over national courts of all states.”12 Like the ICTY,
the ICTR also includes a non bis in idem provision and several deferral orders issued by the Trial
Chamber of the ICTR reflect how primacy was used to obtain exclusive jurisdiction over cases
from national courts with concurrent jurisdiction.13 However, like the ICTY, the ICTR has also
faced its share of difficulties in securing the cooperation of national courts.
Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was established
by way of a bilateral treaty between the UN and Sierra Leone, without the use of Chapter VII
powers.14 Although the SCSL was also vested with concurrent jurisdiction and primacy over the
national courts of Sierra Leone, it has not had to issue a deferral order.15 While challenges to the
jurisdiction and legality of establishment of the SCSL have certainly been made by criminal
defendants, the SCSL has not encountered problems with the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction
with the national courts of Sierra Leone, and it appears unlikely that such issues will occur.16

12

ICTR Statute Art. 8 [Reproduced at Tab 30].

13

Decision of the Trial Chamber on the Application by the Prosecutor for a Formal Request for Deferral to the
Competence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the Matter of Thèoneste Bagosora (Pursuant to
Rules 9 and 10 of the RPE), Thèoneste Bagosora (ICTR-96-7-D), Trial Chamber I, 15 May 1996 [hereinafter
Bagosora] [Reproduced at Tab 9]; Decision of the Trial Chamber on the Application by the Prosecutor for a Formal
Request for Deferral to the Competence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the Matter of Alfred
Musema (Pursuant to Rules 9 and 10 of the RPE), Alfred Musema (ICTR-96-5-D), Trial Chamber I, 3 Dec. 1996
[hereinafter Musema] [Reproduced at Tab 10]; Decision of the Trial Chamber on the Application by the Prosecutor
for a Formal Request for Deferral to the Competence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the
Matter of Radio des Mille Collines Sarl (pursuant to Rules 9 and 10 ICTR RPE), SARL Radio des Mille Collines
(ICTR-96-6-D), Trial Chamber, 12 Mar. 1996 [hereinafter SARL] [Reproduced at Tab 11].
14

Kate Gibson, An Uneasy Co-existence: The Relationship Between Internationalised Criminal Courts and Their
Domestic Counterparts, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 275, 288 (2009) (discussing the SCSL) [Reproduced at Tab 19].
15

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan 16. 2002, Art. 8 [hereinafter SCSL Statute] [Reproduced at Tab
36]; Gibson, supra note 14, at 289 [Reproduced at Tab 19].
16

Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, Charles Ghankay Taylor (SCSL-2003-01-I), Appeals Chamber, 31 May
2004 [hereinafter Charles Taylor][Reproduced at Tab 12]; Gibson, supra note 15, at 292 [Reproduced at Tab 19];
Stephen J. Rapp, The Compact Model in International Criminal Justice: The Special Court for Sierra Leone 57
DRAKE L. REV. 11, 24–25 (2008) (As a result of the Lome Accord, those not prosecuted by the SCSL were given
6

The largest difficulties the SCSL has had to face seem to relate to securing the cooperation of
third party states, as it lacks primacy of jurisdiction over national courts outside Sierra Leone.17
As the history and experiences of these courts indicates, though an international tribunal may be
vested with primacy of jurisdiction over the national courts, ensuring cooperation from national
authorities is vital to obtaining compliance with deferral orders, collecting evidence, and
bringing the accused to justice before the international tribunal.
B. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STL
In order to try those responsible for the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri and 22 others, the Government of Lebanon requested the United Nations establish an
international tribunal.18 Lebanon and the United Nations Security Council negotiated an
agreement in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1664, which entered into force via
Security Council Resolution 1757 on May 30, 2007.19 Due to political stalemate within the
Lebanese Parliament, the STL was established under the UN Security Council’s Chapter VII
powers, which rendered the Lebanon-UN Agreement, Statute, and Annexed documents an
internationally binding agreement. As another memo addresses the implications and status of the
annexed documents, this memo will assume these documents constitute an extension of the UN
Security Council’s Chapter VII authority.20

amnesty, eliminating the need for the issuance of a deferral order as national courts were thereby precluded from
prosecution) [Reproduced at Tab 28].
17

Gibson, supra note 15 [Reproduced at Tab 19].

Letter dated 13 December 2005 from the Chargè d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary General’, U.N. Doc. S/2005/783 [Reproduced at Tab 42].
18

19

S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007) [hereinafter STL Statute] [Reproduced at Tab 31].

20

See Keith White, The Cooperative Obligations Owed by Lebanon and Other States to the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, Fall 2010 (discussing the legality of these documents).
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C. CHARACTER OF THE STL COMPARED TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS
Due to its method of establishment, the STL is most similar in character to ad hoc
resolution-based tribunals, such as the ICTY and ICTR.21 However, unlike the ICTY and ICTR,
the STL does not have primacy of jurisdiction over third party states.22 Thus, the STL is also
somewhat similar in character to the SCSL, which, though established by international
agreement, exercises concurrent jurisdiction and primacy over only the national courts of Sierra
Leone.23
The STL bears several unique features. Chief among them, the STL will apply Lebanese
law to prosecute those responsible for the assassination of Rafiq Hariri for:
Terrorism, crimes and offences against life and personal integrity, illicit
associations and failure to report crimes and offences, including the rules
regarding the material elements of a crime, criminal participation and conspiracy,
and Articles 6 and 7 of the Lebanese law of 11 January 1958 on “Increasing the
penalties for sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle.”24
In contrast, the ICTY and ICTR have jurisdiction over international crimes, including genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity.25 The SCSL has jurisdiction over these international
crimes (excluding genocide), and domestic crimes under Sierra Leonean law.26 While similar to
the SCSL in the sense that the STL will prosecute for national crimes, the STL is the first
Jan Erik Wetzel & Yvonne Mitri, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: A Court “Off the Shelf” for a Divided
Country, 7 L. & PRAC. INT’L COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 81, 94 (2008) (noting the similarities) [Reproduced at Tab
20].
21

22

See Table 1.1.

23

Gibson, supra note 17, at 288–89 [Reproduced at Tab 19].

24

STL Statute, supra note 19, at Art. 2 [Reproduced at Tab 31]; Björn Elberling, The Next Step in History-Writing
through Criminal Law: Exactly How Tailor-Made Is the Special Tribunal for Lebanon?, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 529,
534 (2008) [Reproduced at Tab 21].
25

Wetzel & Mitri, supra note 21, at 100 (discussing jurisdiction) [Reproduced at Tab 20].

26

SCSL Statute, supra note 15 [Reproduced at Tab 36].
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international tribunal completely lacking jurisdiction over any of the “core crimes” against
international law.27 In addition, the STL is not bound or restricted by a duty to prosecute only
those “most responsible,” as is the SCSL, and as the ICTR sought to do in practice.28
The experiences of the other international hybrid courts with primacy and concurrent
jurisdiction are intentionally excluded from this memo, as these courts are not as similar in
structure, nature, and experience to the STL as the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL. For example, the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and Special Panels in East Timor
have been characterized as being established as part of the existing national court system, which
is clearly not the case with the STL.29 Furthermore, though the ECCC maintains concurrent
jurisdiction with the national court system, it is unlikely that the national court system will
attempt to interfere with the ECCC’s proceedings, as no one has tried to prosecute those
responsible for international crimes in Cambodia in decades, the statute of limitations in the
national courts has expired, and many former Khmer Rouge allegedly responsible for the crimes
at issue now make up the judiciary and national government of Cambodia.30 As the ICTY,
ICTR, and SCSL are the most similar in character for purposes of comparison, the following
tables illustrate the primacy and jurisdiction of each of the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and STL as well
as the deferral mechanisms of each.

27

Wetzel & Mitri, supra note 25, at 101 [Reproduced at Tab 20].

28

Id. at 98 [Reproduced at Tab 20].

29

Gibson, supra note 24, at 279 [Reproduced at Tab 19].

30

Id. at 293–95 [Reproduced at Tab 19].
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Table 1.1: Primacy and Concurrent Jurisdiction by Statute31
ICTY

ICTR

SCSL

STL

Article 9

Article 8

Article 8

Article 4 (1)

The International Tribunal and
national courts shall have
concurrent jurisdiction to
prosecute persons for serious
violations of international
humanitarian law committed in
the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1 January
1991.

The International Tribunal for
Rwanda and national courts shall
have concurrent jurisdiction to
prosecute persons for serious
violations of international
humanitarian law committed in
the territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan citizens for such
violations committed in the
territory of neighboring States,
between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994.

The Special Court
and the national
courts of Sierra
Leone shall have
concurrent
jurisdiction.

The Special
Tribunal shall
have concurrent
jurisdiction.

The International Tribunal shall
have primacy over national
courts.

The International Tribunal shall
have primacy over national
courts of all states.

The Special Court
shall have primacy
over the national
courts of Sierra
Leone.

Within its
jurisdiction, the
Tribunal shall
have primacy
over the
national courts
of Lebanon.

31

ICTY Statute Art. 9 [Reproduced at Tab 29]; ICTR Statute Art. 8 [Reproduced at Tab 30]; SCSL Statute Art. 8
[Reproduced at Tab 36]; STL Statute Art. 4 [Reproduced at Tab 31].
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Table 1.2: Deferral Mechanisms by Statute
ICTY

ICTR

SCSL

STL

Article 8

Article 9

Article 8

Article 4 (2)

At any stage of the
procedure, the
International Tribunal
may formally request
national courts to defer
to the competence of the
International Tribunal in
accordance with the
present Statute and the
Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of the
International Tribunal

At any stage of the
procedure, the
International
Tribunal for
Rwanda may
formally request
national courts to
defer to its
competence in
accordance with
the present Statute
and the Rules of
Procedure and
Evidence of the
International
Tribunal

At any stage of the
procedure, the
Special Court may
formally request a
national court to
defer to its
competence in
accordance with
the present Statute
and Rules of
Procedure and
Evidence.

Upon the assumption of the office of the
Prosecutor, as determined by the SecretaryGeneral, and no later than two months
thereafter, the Special Tribunal shall request
the national judicial authority seized with the
case of the attack against Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri and others to defer to its competence.
The Lebanese judicial authority shall refer to
the Tribunal the results of the investigation and
a copy of the court’s records, if any. Persons
detained in connection with the investigation
shall be transferred to the custody of the
Tribunal.
Article 4(3)
At the request of the Special Tribunal, the
national judicial authority
seized with any of the other crimes committed
between 1 October 2004 and
12 December 2005, or a later date decided
pursuant to article 1, shall refer to the Tribunal
the results of the investigation and a copy of
the court’s records, if any, for review by the
Prosecutor;
At the further request of the Tribunal, the
national authority in question shall defer to the
competence of the Tribunal. It shall refer to the
Tribunal the results of the investigation and a
copy of the court’s records, if any, and persons
detained in connection with any such case shall
be transferred to the custody of the Tribunal;
The national judicial authorities shall regularly
inform the Tribunal of the progress of their
investigation. At any stage of the proceedings,
the Tribunal may formally request a national
judicial authority to defer to its competence.

11

III. JURISDICTION AND STATUTE
A. JURISDICTION
Because the STL may only exercise primacy over matters falling within its jurisdiction,
some discussion of exactly what matters fall within its jurisdiction is necessary. In comparison
to the other international tribunals, the STL was granted a very limited temporal jurisdiction over
only one incident: “the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons.”32 However, this
jurisdiction may be expanded with the consent of the United Nations Security Council to cover
other acts of violence between 1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005, or events occurring later,
if the Tribunal finds that such acts are linked to Hariri’s assassination in accordance with the
principles of criminal justice, and are of a similar nature and gravity.33 Such acts could be linked
to Hariri’s assassination by motive, purpose, nature of the victims targeted, pattern of attacks, or
perpetrators.34 As several other members of the Lebanese Parliament have been assassinated
after the cut-off date for the STL’s jurisdiction, an attempt to expand the temporal jurisdiction
may eventually become necessary.35
The STL’s personal jurisdiction gives the Tribunal jurisdiction over “persons responsible
for the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons.”36 Finally, the STL’s jurisdiction is

32

STL Statute Art. 1 [Reproduced at Tab 31].

33

STL Statute Art. 1 [Reproduced at Tab 31].

34

STL Statute Art. 1 [Reproduced at Tab 31].

David Cutler, Chronology: Events in Lebanon Since Hariri’s Killing, REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2008),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL14627460 [Reproduced at Tab 47].
35

36

STL Statute Art. 1 [Reproduced at Tab 31].
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restricted territorially to events that occurred within Lebanon by Article 1 and 4(1) of the STL
Statute.37
B. STATUTE, AGREEMENT, AND THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
While Article 4(1) of the Tribunal’s statute proscribes concurrent jurisdiction and
primacy, Article 4(2) and 4(3) of the Statute provide two deferral regimes by which the Tribunal
may exercise its primacy.38 Article 4(3) of the Statute essentially mirrors the deferral system of
the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL.39 However, Article 4(2) is unique in that it requires automatic
deferral of the Hariri case to the Tribunal, a pre-determined result by the U.N. Security
Council.40
In combination with the Tribunal’s Statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence govern
the means by which the Tribunal may exercise primacy over Lebanese courts. The Statute of the
Tribunal required the judges to adopt Rules of Procedure and Evidence to govern the “conduct of
the pre-trial, trial, and appellate proceedings, the admission of evidence, the participation of
victims, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters and may amend
them, as appropriate.”41 The Tribunal adopted its Rules of Procedure of Evidence on March 20,
2009.42

37

STL Statute Art. 1, 4(1) (granting primacy of jurisdiction over the national courts of Lebanon, to the exclusion of
jurisdiction over other national courts) [Reproduced at Tab 31].
38

STL Statute Art. 4 [Reproduced at Tab 31].

39

See Table 1.2, STL Statute Art. 4(3) [Reproduced at Tab 31].

40

Guénaël Mettraux, The Internationalization of Domestic Jurisdictions by International Tribunals: The Special
Tribunal for Lebanon Renders Its First Decisions, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 911, 912 (2009) [Reproduced at Tab 22].
41

STL Statute Art. 28 [Reproduced at Tab 31].

42

Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, STL/BD/2009/01/Rev.2 (Oct. 30, 2009)
[hereinafter STL RPE][Reproduced at Tab 39].
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Rule 17 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence explains the procedures to be
followed in issuing a deferral order.43 Upon receipt of a deferral order pursuant to 17(A), the
national court must “defer to the Tribunal’s competence, hand over to the Prosecutor the results
of the investigations and a copy of the relevant court records and other probative material, and
submit to the Pre-Trial Judge a list of all persons detained in connection with the
investigation.”44 In addition to this procedure for deferral which corresponds with Article 4(2) of
the Statute, under Rule 17(E), the prosecutor may make a request to the pre-trial judge that “any
investigation in Lebanon or criminal proceedings instituted in the courts of Lebanon … [be]
defer[red] to the competence of the Tribunal.”45 The Pre-Trial Judge issued a deferral order of
the Hariri case, as required by Article 4(2) and Rule 17(A) on March 27, 2009.46
If subject matter or temporal jurisdiction are expanded to cover events related to the
Hariri attack or other attacks, Rule 16 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence allows the
Prosecutor to request information from the Lebanese authorities, and provides that the Prosecutor
may request their assistance in investigations, request permission to conduct these activities
independently with his staff, or a combination of the two.47
Lebanon is obligated to comply with such orders and requests. For example, Article 15 of
the Lebanon-UN Agreement compels Lebanon to cooperate with the Tribunal in facilitating
access to sites, persons, and relevant documents required for the investigation, and specifically
states:
43

STL RPE Rule 17 [Reproduced at Tab 39].

44

STL RPE Rule 17 [Reproduced at Tab 39].

45

STL RPE Rule 17 (E) [Reproduced at Tab 39].

46

Deferral Order of March 27, 2009 (CH/PTJ/2009/01) [Reproduced at Tab 13].

47

STL RPE Rule 16 [Reproduced at Tab 39].
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The Government shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance by
the Special Tribunal or an order issued by the Chambers, including, but not limited to:
identification and location of persons, service of documents, arrest or detention of
persons, and transfer of an indictee to the Tribunal.48
These obligations are reinforced by the Memorandum of Understanding between the
Government of Lebanon and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon Concerning the Office of the
Special Tribunal in Lebanon, signed on June 17, 2009.49 In tandem with these provisions, Rule
20 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence further stipulates the Lebanese authorities’ duties to
comply, and the procedure by which Lebanese non-compliance may be reported to the UN
Security Council.50 Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, this process requires the President of the
Tribunal to conduct a consultation with Lebanese authorities in an attempt to gain the necessary
compliance.51 On April 8, 2009, the Lebanese judge complied with these duties outlined in the
Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ordering the transfer of documents to the Tribunal
and halting prosecution of the Hariri case.52
C. VERTICAL COOPERATION
Juxtaposed against these procedural mechanisms for ensuring primacy, the STL is largely
dependent on a system of vertical cooperation with the Lebanese authorities for prosecutorial
purposes. Under Article 11 of the Statute, the Office of the Prosecutor has the ability to

48

STL Statute, Agreement at Art. 15 [Reproduced at Tab 31].

49

Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Lebanon and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
Concerning the Office of the Special Tribunal in Lebanon, June 17, 2009 at Art. 4, 6 [Reproduced at Tab 40].
50

STL RPE Rule 20 [Reproduced at Tab 39].

51

STL RPE Rule 20 [Reproduced at Tab 39] but compare ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence Rule 11
[hereinafter ICTY RPE][Reproduced at Tab 37]; ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence Rule 11 [hereinafter ICTR
RPE] [Reproduced at Tab 38].
52

Warrants Lifted Against Generals in Hariri Case, AFP (Apr. 8, 2009),
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ji76JFxE1oDMTGGk50DyUETQzRRw [Reproduced at
Tab 48].
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“question suspects, victims, and witnesses, to collect evidence, and to conduct on-site
investigations” independently of the Lebanese authorities “as appropriate.”53 In order to
safeguard Lebanese sovereignty, however, the decision of the Prosecutor to do so is subject to
judicial scrutiny, pursuant to Rule 77 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence which state: “when
necessary and appropriate, the Prosecutor must be authorized by the Pre-Trial Judge to conduct
investigative acts without the involvement of Lebanese authorities.”54
IV. PRIMACY, CONCURRENT JURISDICTION, AND DEFERRAL ORDERS
IN THE OTHER INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
A. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA
The ICTY has primacy over national courts and may issue a request for deferral at any
stage of proceedings under its Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence.55 Like the STL, the
ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Statute also include an obligation to comply with
orders and requests to defer to the competence of the Tribunal.56 Under the ICTY Statute, this
obligation imposes duties on national judicial authorities to comply with requests from the Trial
Chamber similar to those under the Agreement of the STL.57

53

STL Statute Art. 11 [Reproduced at Tab 31].

54

President of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Annual Report (2009-2010) (Mar.
1, 2010) at ¶51 [Reproduced at Tab 46].
55

ICTY Statute Art. 9 [Reproduced at Tab 29].

56

STL Statute, Agreement at Art. 15 [Reproduced at Tab 31]; STL RPE Rule 17 [Reproduced at Tab 39] but
compare ICTY Statute Art.29 [Reproduced at Tab 29]; ICTY RPE Rule 8 [Reproduced at Tab 37].
57

ICTY Statute Art. 29 [Reproduced at Tab 29]; compare STL Statute, Agreement at Art. 15 [Reproduced at Tab
31].
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As the ICTY was largely based on an adversarial model, whether or not to exercise this
primacy is initially up to the discretion of the Prosecutor.58 The Prosecutor can make a request
for deferral of a case under Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in three instances:
(i) The act being investigated or which is the subject of those proceedings is
characterized as an ordinary crime;
(ii) There is a lack of impartiality or independence, or the investigations or
proceedings are designed to shield the accused from international criminal
responsibility, or the case is not diligently prosecuted;
(iii) What is in issue is closely related to, or otherwise involves, significant factual
or legal questions which may have implications for investigations or prosecutions
before the Tribunal.59
Nonetheless, the primacy of the ICTY was not intended to replace the jurisdiction of the
national courts.60 As such, the non bis in idem provision of Article 10 of the ICTY Statute
protects an accused from “double jeopardy”; a convicted or acquitted person may not be retried
at the international level for violations of international humanitarian law unless (at the domestic
level) the crime was characterized as an ordinary crime or the national proceedings were
somehow biased or not diligently prosecuted.61 However, in the event a state refuses to comply
with a deferral order, the Trial Chamber can report the issue to the President of the Tribunal, who
may refer the matter to the Security Council.62
In terms of cooperation between national authorities, the chief responsibility for
investigation lies with the Prosecutor of the ICTY. Article 18 of the ICTY Statute allows the
1 VIRGINIA A. MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 128 (1995) [Reproduced at Tab 16].
58

59

ICTY RPE Rule 9 [Reproduced at Tab 37].

60

U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808 (1993), ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [Reproduced at Tab 43].
61

ICTY Statute Art. 10 [Reproduced at Tab 29].

62

ICTY RPE Rule 11 [Reproduced at Tab 37].
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Prosecutor to conduct investigations independently of the host state, but enables the Prosecutor,
where appropriate, to obtain assistance from national authorities.63 Although the Security
Council Resolution that created the ICTY is a binding international agreement, without
permission from the host state via implementing legislation, the Prosecutor is unable to exercise
this power.64
In the experience of the ICTY, deferral orders were therefore used in the initial stages of
its operation to obtain exclusive jurisdiction over defendants but later became unnecessary as
suspects were apprehended or turned themselves in to the ICTY before national proceedings had
a chance to occur.65 Several key cases demonstrate the effect of a deferral order and illustrate the
extent of the ICTY’s primacy over national courts.
1. THE DUTY OF COMPLIANCE AND SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES: PROSECUTOR V. DUSKO TADIC
The first case ever to come before the ICTY raised the issue of primacy. Proceedings
were initially brought against Dusko Tadic by the Federal Republic of Germany.66 Prosecutor
Richard Goldstone subsequently sought deferral of the case to the ICTY, invoking Article 9 of
the ICTY Statute and Rules 8, 9, and 10 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.67 The
Prosecutor maintained his request for deferral under Rule 9 (iii), arguing that the Tadic case

63

ICTY Statute Art. 18 [Reproduced at Tab 29].

64

Stroh, supra note 5, at 267 [Reproduced at Tab 18].

65

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA,
AND SIERRA LEONE 383 (2006) [Reproduced at Tab 14].
Faculty, The Judge Advocate General’s School, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET, 50 (November 1995) [Reproduced at Tab 23].
66

67

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-D, Decision of the Trial Chamber on the Application by the Prosecutor for
a Formal Request for Deferral to the Competence of the International Tribunal in the Matter of Dusko Tadic (Nov.
8, 1994) [Reproduced at Tab 3].
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included “significant factual or legal questions which may have implications for the Tribunal.”68
To support his claim that the Tadic case was one in which the Tribunal should exercise primacy,
the Prosecutor pointed to the fact that Germany may not have been able to get jurisdiction over
other potential co-offenders and accomplices, that he had already interviewed witnesses outside
of Germany necessary to the case, and that his investigation included investigations for
additional offenses allegedly committed by Tadic which Germany had not yet undertaken.69 He
also added that this matter fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.70 Taking into
consideration these factors, the pre-trial judge granted the deferral order.71
In a demonstration of the ICTY’s primacy over the national court of Germany, the pretrial judge also specifically noted that Germany had a legal obligation under Article 29 of the
Tribunal’s Statute to comply with the order and could not use its domestic laws as a shield to
avoid compliance.72 Germany, willing to comply with the ICTY’s request, implemented the
necessary domestic legislation it needed to transfer the case and turned it over to the ICTY.73
When the case proceeded to trial, Tadic filed a motion challenging this exercise of the ICTY’s
primacy of jurisdiction as unfounded, but the Trial Chamber refused to rule on this issue and
dismissed the motion, as it turned on the question of the legality of the ICTY’s establishment.74

68

Id. at ¶1 [Reproduced at Tab 3].

69

Id. at ¶4–5 [Reproduced at Tab 3].

70

Id. at ¶6 [Reproduced at Tab 3].

71

Id. at 13 [Reproduced at Tab 3].

72

Id. at ¶19–20 [Reproduced at Tab 3].

73

Brown, supra note 10, at 403 [Reproduced at Tab 24].

74

Tadic Appeal, supra note 7 at ¶2–3 [Reproduced at Tab 4].
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When the matter was taken up in the interlocutory appeal, Tadic again attempted to
challenge the ICTY’s primacy. First, Tadic tried to maintain what is essentially a non bis in
idem argument claiming that because Germany had already “tried” him and been diligent in his
prosecution, the Trial Chamber had no authority to be able to claim primacy of jurisdiction.75
However, the Appeals Chamber quickly dismissed this argument on the facts by distinguishing
that the Germans were merely in the midst of investigations and had not yet actually begun to
prosecute him, and by noting that under Article 9 of the Statute, a request for deferral can be
made “at any stage of the procedure.”76 This was therefore not a true case of non bis in idem.
The heart of Tadic’s unjustified primacy argument essentially rested upon four prongs: 1)
Bosnia-Herzegovina had jurisdiction over the case, 2) the Security Council had illegally
established the ICTY in violation of Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter, and 3) under the
principle of jus de non evocando, Tadic retained the right to be tried by his national courts under
his national laws.77 The Prosecutor did not dispute the first prong, which merely recognized the
concurrent jurisdiction of the ICTY with Bosnia-Herzegovina.78
Examining the second prong, the Appeals Chamber found that while Tadic had a right to
raise a plea of state sovereignty and was not barred for lack of standing, pursuant to Article 2(7)
of the UN Charter, the Security Council is not restricted from interfering in the affairs of
sovereign states when it invokes Chapter VII authority, which it exercised in establishing the
ICTY.79 The Appeals Chamber pointed to the fact that even without the exercise of Chapter VII

75

Id. at ¶51 [Reproduced at Tab 4].

76

Id. at ¶52 [Reproduced at Tab 4].

77

Id. at ¶54–64. [Reproduced at Tab 4].

78

Id. at ¶54 [Reproduced at Tab 4].

79

Id. at ¶55–56 [Reproduced at Tab 4].
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authority, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Germany had endorsed and cooperated with the ICTY,
voluntarily submitting to the jurisdiction of the ICTY.80 Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber
considered the nature and gravity of the crimes alleged (“offenses which, if proven, do not affect
the interests of one State alone but shock the conscience of mankind”), and found that this
created a special need for primacy of jurisdiction over national courts because otherwise, “human
nature being what it is, there would be a perennial danger of international crimes being
characterized as ‘ordinary crimes.’”81
Finally, under the third prong of Tadic’s argument, the Appeals Chamber recognized the
right of an accused to be tried by his national court when looking to various national
constitutions, but found that the principle of jus de non evocando did not apply in an
international tribunal established by the Security Council acting on behalf of the community of
nations.82 As all three prongs of Tadic’s arguments against the primacy of the ICTY failed, the
Appellate Chamber dismissed his claim that the ICTY was established illegally, and reaffirmed
the primacy of its own jurisdiction.83 While Tadic illustrates the exercise of primacy over a
German court through the issuance of a deferral order, and how challenges to the legality of
establishment may play a role in a primacy argument, the German court was more than willing to
cooperate. What may happen when national authorities refuse to cooperate? The next case takes
up this issue directly.

80

Id. at ¶56 [Reproduced at Tab 4].

81

Id. at ¶57–58 [Reproduced at Tab 4].

82

Id. at ¶61–63 [Reproduced at Tab 4].

83

Id. at ¶146 [Reproduced at Tab 4].
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2. COMPLIANCE WITH NATIONAL JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES: PROSECUTOR V. MILE MRKSIC, ET.
AL

In Mrksic, the ICTY issued international warrants for the arrest of three officers, indicted
for their alleged participation in a mass killing of captive non-Serb men taken from Vukovar
Hospital.84 The three were never arrested by the authorities of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), though it had initiated an investigation into the killings. Upon learning of
proceedings initiated against the three officers before the Military Court in Belgrade, the
Prosecutor made a request for formal deferral of the case, this time under Rule 9(ii) and 9(iii).85
The Trial Chamber held:
Considering…the continuing refusal of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) to surrender the said accused indicates that the
proceedings initiated in its territory would be neither impartial nor independent
and would be designed to shield the accused from his international criminal
responsibility.86
As in Tadic, the Trial Chamber also noted the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)’s
duty to comply under Article 29 of the Statute, finding there was no possibility the Military
Court in Belgrade could have been unaware as to the ICTY’s issuance of an international arrest
warrant.87 Finally, as the proceedings against the accused related to facts and questions of law
that would have significant implications before the Tribunal, the Trial Chamber found this
circumstance was sufficient, on its own, to justify issuing a deferral order over the case.88

84

Mrksic, supra note 7, at 4 [Reproduced at Tab 5]; Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, ICTY Press Release CC/PIU/370-E (Dec. 7, 1998) “Vukovar Hospital” Case: The Prosecutor Seeks the
Deferral to the ICTY of Proceedings Instituted in Serbia Against M. Mrksic, V. Slijvancanin and M. Radic Deferral
Hearing to be Held on Wednesday 9 December, available at http://www.icty.org/sid/7611 [Reproduced at Tab 44].
85

Mrksic, supra note 84 [Reproduced at Tab 5].
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Id. at 3 [Reproduced at Tab 5].
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Id. at 4 [Reproduced at Tab 5].

88

Id. at 4–5 [Reproduced at Tab 5].
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While the Trial Chamber issued the deferral order to the Military Court in Belgrade, the
former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) failed to arrest and transfer all three officers.89
Despite repeated referral of the issue to the Security Council, Mrksic and Radic were not handed
over to the ICTY until 2002 when they turned themselves in, and Slijvancanin avoided
prosecution until his capture in 2003.90 Thus Mrksic illustrates that despite possessing primacy
over the Military Court in Belgrade, the ICTY was limited in its efforts to bring these individuals
to justice by simple non-compliance with its deferral order.
3. PRIMACY OVER ENTIRE EVENTS OR INCIDENTS: THE LASVA RIVER VALLEY AND
MACEDONIA DEFERRALS
The Lasva River Valley and Macedonia deferrals represent instances in which the ICTY
was faced with the ability to grant or deny a deferral order over an entire incident rather than a
particular case or defendant. In the Lasva River Valley decision, the Trial Chamber granted a
formal request for deferral under Rule 9(iii) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.91 Bosnia
and Herzegovina, like Germany in the Tadic case, was more than willing to defer prosecution of
the incident to the ICTY.92 The Trial Chamber accepted that the investigations were sufficiently
related and invoked the ICTY’s primacy, formally requesting that Bosnia and Herzegovina defer
to the Tribunal:

89

Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY Press Release JL/P.I.S./444-E
(Nov. 2, 1999) Letter from President Mcdonald to the President of the Security Council concerning Outstanding
Issues of State Non-Compliance, available at http://www.icty.org/sid/7726 [Reproduced at Tab 45].
90
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All investigations and criminal proceedings respecting serious violations of
international humanitarian law, as set forth in Articles 2 to 5 of the Statute of the
International Tribunal concerning the population of the Lasva River Valley
between October 1992 and May 1993.93
In the case of the Macedonia deferrals, the Trial Chamber similarly granted a deferral
order over several large scale incidents at once.94 In the “Mavrovo Road Workers Case,” the
Prosecutor sought to obtain deferral of an entire incident, but was not, at that time, willing to
prosecute two of the suspected individuals.95 The Trial Chamber granted a deferral order over
the incident, but respecting the principle of concurrent jurisdiction and noting the potentially
frustrating effect this order could have on the domestic authorities’ ability to prosecute, invited
both parties to a new hearing after 9 months time to see if this “blocking effect” would still be
justified.96
Another relevant incident within the Macedonia deferral is the “NLA Leadership” case.
In the “NLA Leadership” case, the Trial Chamber declined to grant the Prosecutor’s request for a
clause in the decision requiring Macedonia to defer “all current and future investigations and
prosecutions” of alleged crimes in one of the incidents, as this would “effectively block the
domestic courts from initiating any investigation or prosecution with regard to these groups of
alleged perpetrators.”97 While recognizing the denial of this request as perhaps the outer limit of
the ICTY’s primacy, this request may also have been denied due to a perception that the ICTY
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should refer cases back to the national courts at this time rather than take up new ones, as
confidence in the national court system of the former Yugoslavia started to develop.98
The Macedonian authorities complied with the request for deferral of these cases, and the
Office of the Prosecutor for the ICTY began its investigations.99 Thereafter, Security Council
Resolutions 1503 and 1534 were issued and the Prosecutor decided to refer both cases back to
the national authorities for prosecution as part of the completion strategy for the ICTY.100 These
cases still await resolution in the national courts.101
The experience of the ICTY demonstrates the procedure for the exercise of primacy over
national courts through the issuance of a deferral order and that challenges to the legality of
establishment of an international tribunal can play a role in a primacy argument. Most national
authorities subsequently comply with deferral orders, but when they do not, the matter may be
referred to the United Nations Security Council which has the power to issue a binding
resolution on the matter. Finally, as the Macedonia deferrals illustrate, it is not unprecedented to
obtain a deferral order over an entire event or incident.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
The ICTR has concurrent jurisdiction with national courts, but exercises primacy over
“all national courts.”102 The ICTR may request deferral of a case at any stage of the proceedings,
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but, like the ICTY, is limited by a non bis in idem provision.103 A duty to comply with requests
of the Tribunal is also enshrined in the ICTR’s Statute.104 The ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence are essentially identical to those of the ICTY in outlining the deferral process and in
further stipulating that any refusal to comply with its requests merit referral to the President and
then to the Security Council.105 The ICTR Prosecutor also possesses the ability to conduct
investigations without the assistance of the host state, but is limited by a need for states to have
implemented domestic legislation enabling deferral.106 The Prosecutor may request assistance
from the host state in its investigation.107 While the previously discussed cases from the ICTY
exemplify the scope of jurisdictional primacy, the following cases from the ICTR illustrate the
way in which Rule 9 and the non bis in idem provision of the ICTR Statute may act as a
limitation on an international tribunal’s jurisdiction and as an argument in favor of deferral.
NON BIS IN IDEM AS A POTENTIAL LIMIT TO PRIMACY AND AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF
DEFERRAL: THÈONESTE BAGOSORA, ALFRED MUSEMA, AND RADIO TELEVISION LIBRE
DES MILLE COLLINES SARL
In the case of Thèoneste Bagosora, the Prosecutor applied for a deferral order against
Belgian authorities under Rule 9(iii) of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence.108 In order
to overcome the non bis in idem provision of Article 9 of the ICTR Statute and meet the
requirements for the deferral order, the Prosecutor must demonstrate that: 1) proceedings have
been initiated by the national authorities for crimes within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, 2) an
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investigation of the alleged crimes within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction are in fact simultaneously
being undertaken, and 3) that these investigations or criminal proceedings are “closely related to,
or otherwise involve factual or legal questions which may have implications for the Prosecutor’s
investigations or prosecutions.”109 The Prosecutor therefore maintained that Belgium had begun
investigations against Bagosora for murder and violating the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 and Additional Protocols I and II of June 8 1977, that he had also initiated investigations
into crimes allegedly perpetrated by Bagosora within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and that
Belgium’s investigations were closely related or otherwise involved factual and legal questions
with implications for the Tribunal.110 The Prosecutor also argued that Belgium’s simultaneous
investigations might frustrate the investigative process and cooperation of witnesses, potentially
placing their lives at risk.111
Furthermore, the Prosecutor claimed that because Belgian law did not contain provisions
against violations of international humanitarian law, there would be a significant risk that if
Belgium were to try Bagosora, the Tribunal would be unable to subsequently prosecute him on
the same facts for genocide and crimes against humanity due to the non bis in idem provision.112
Accepting this argument as part of the Prosecutor’s arguments under Rule 9(iii) and noting that,
“the investigations by the Prosecutor focus mainly on persons in positions of authority…[and]
Colonel Thèoneste Bagosora’s alleged criminal responsibility seems most important”, the Trial
Chamber granted the deferral order.113 Thus, as Bagosora tends to indicate, deferral orders are
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typically reserved for those thought to be most involved, at the highest levels of authority and
responsibility.
In the case of Alfred Musema, the Trial Chamber accepted a 9(iii) argument for deferral
identical to the argument for deferral made in Bagosora, as the Prosecutor claimed that if the
Trial Chamber did not grant a deferral against the Swiss judicial authorities, the ICTR may be
precluded from prosecuting Musema for serious violations of international humanitarian law in
the future by the non bis idem provision.114 The Swiss authorities had begun investigating
Musema for allegations of murder and incitement to murder Tutsis and moderate Hutus, and
crimes punishable under the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols of
8 June 1977.115 Noting the “seriousness of the factual charges and of the legal questions which
are bound to be raised in connection with the case,” the Trial Chamber granted the deferral
order.116
Finally, similar to the Lasva River Valley and Macedonia Deferrals of the ICTY which
granted deferral orders over entire incidents or events, in Radio Television Mille Collines, the
Prosecutor requested deferral of all investigations and criminal proceedings being undertaken by
Belgium relating to persons associated with a radio station, as well as the radio station itself.117
Belgium had begun investigating the relationship between the activities and persons running the
radio station, and the Prosecutor claimed these activities and persons were within the ICTR’s
jurisdiction.118 The Trial Chamber, noting the possibility of preclusion by the non bis in idem
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provision if Belgium were to continue prosecution, granted the deferral order, just as in Bagosora
and Musema.119
The experience of the ICTR reveals that non bis in idem may serve as a potential limit to
the exercise of primacy. However, non bis in idem may also be used by the Prosecutor as an
argument in favor of deferral. Finally, similar to the ICTY’s ability to obtain a deferral order
over entire events or incidents, the ICTR was able to obtain deferral over an entire entity as
Radio Television Mille Collines readily demonstrates.
C. THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
Unlike the ICTY and the ICTR, the SCSL was established by bilateral agreement.120 The
SCSL has concurrent jurisdiction with and primacy over the national courts of Sierra Leone.121
In this sense, the SCSL asserts a “limited primacy.”122 The SCSL was vested with the power to
issue a deferral order, however, it has yet to exercise this ability; it is possible that the mere
inclusion of this ability has been enough to discourage the national courts of Sierra Leone from
attempting to interfere.123 However, this is more likely due to the fact that the rebels responsible
for the violent coup de’tat in Sierra Leone were granted amnesty by the 1999 Lome Accord,
barring them from national prosecution.124 Similar to the other tribunals, the Statute of the SCSL
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also carries a non bis in idem provision, which allows the SCSL to try an individual that has
already been tried by the national courts, but only in the event that the acts were characterized as
ordinary crimes at the national level, the national proceedings were not impartial or independent,
or the case was not diligently prosecuted.125
Though the experience of the SCSL reveals that it has not had much difficulty in
maintaining primacy of jurisdiction over the national courts of Sierra Leone, the Charles Taylor
case illustrates one way in which the legality of its establishment relates to the ability to exercise
primacy. As the Appellate Chamber in Charles Taylor held, “the Agreement between the United
Nations and Sierra Leone is… an agreement between all members of the United Nations and
Sierra Leone.”126 Inherent in this statement is evidence that the judges considered the bilateral
agreement as only the derived basis for legality of the SCSL’s establishment, but found the
primary basis in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.127 Thus, the SCSL was able to
assert itself as an international court, even though it was established by a bilateral agreement.128
V. THE EFFECT OF A DEFERRAL ORDER ON THE STL AND LEBANON
A. THE DEFERRAL ORDER OF MAR. 27, 2009 WAS AN EXERCISE OF PRIMACY
The Deferral Order issued by the Pre-Trial Judge of the STL on March 27, 2009 was an
exercise of primacy. As the experience of the other international tribunals illustrates, once a
deferral order has been issued and complied with, national authorities are relieved from
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prosecution and cannot interfere.129 Thus, in combination with the STL’s Statute and Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, once Lebanese judicial authorities receive a deferral order, they fall
under a binding international legal duty to comply with such an order by transferring the case,
halting prosecution, transferring the accused, and producing the required documents and records.
The Lebanese judge’s submission of the case to the STL relinquishes the ability of Lebanese
judicial authorities to interfere or conduct simultaneous independent investigations, though the
STL may still request and authorize their continued cooperation.130
B. THE STL HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE HARIRI CASE
Similar to the other international tribunals, the STL exercises exclusive jurisdiction with
respect to cases in which the Trial Chamber has granted a deferral order. As Article 4(2) of the
STL Statute requires, “the Lebanese judicial authority shall refer to the Tribunal the results of the
investigation and a copy of the court’s records, if any. Persons detained in connection with the
investigation shall be transferred to the custody of the Tribunal.” Thus the concurrent
jurisdictional relationship between Lebanese national authorities and the STL is one in which,
“in relation to the Hariri incident at least, the Special Tribunal has been created with a view to
replacing the jurisdictional competence of the Lebanese judicial authorities.”131
This exclusive jurisdiction could be extended to cover future investigations of currently
unknown perpetrators, via the deferral procedure enshrined in Article 4(2) of the STL Statute and
Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.132 Like the ICTY in the case of the Lavsa
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River Valley and Macedonia deferrals and the ICTR in the case of Radio Television Mille
Collines, the STL is attempting to maintain jurisdiction over one isolated event or incident, that
is, the Hariri case and potentially related incidents.133 As it appears that Article 4(2) of the
Statute is intended to replace the competence of the Lebanese judicial authorities, and there is no
indication that the STL is currently interested in referring cases back to the Lebanese courts, the
case for exclusive jurisdiction is quite strong. This exclusive jurisdiction may be extended over
events related to the Hariri case under Article 4(3), though some limitations to the exercise of
jurisdiction could arise.
VI. POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS
A. STATE SOVEREIGNTY MAY ACT AS A LIMITATION ON THE JURISDICTION
OF THE STL
Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the STL was only indirectly established under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter by Security Council Resolution 1757.134 Though securing cooperation from
third party states with a deferral order may present potential obstacles and difficulties due to the
conflict between state sovereignty and the lack of the STL’s primacy over third party states, it is
unlikely such a dilemma would arise with respect to Lebanon, as Lebanon requested the Tribunal
be established in the first place.135 Moreover, Lebanon is legally obligated to comply under
Article 15 of the Agreement.136
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In addition, as in Tadic, the case for primacy of the STL over the assassination of Rafiq
Hariri and related incidents is particularly strong, considering that a characterization of terrorist
attacks committed in an attempt to destabilize Lebanon as an “ordinary crime” would not only
have a detrimental impact on Lebanon, but could have serious implications for international
peace and security.137 Even without an internationally accepted definition of terrorism, the idea
that such acts constitute threats to international peace and security has already been accepted by
the international community.138 Furthermore, as the experience of the SCSL has shown, by
arguing that Chapter VII authority enveloped the Lebanese-UN Agreement into an international
one, the Prosecutor may be able to create an argument that third party states are in fact obligated
to comply with the deferral orders and requests of the STL, as Security Council Resolution 1757
and the annexed documents and agreement turned the entire package into “an expression of the
will of the international community” and is therefore an internationally binding agreement.139
Nonetheless, even if such an argument were accepted, this would not supplant the need
for states to have enacted domestic implementing legislation. For example, as evidenced by the
experience of both the ICTY and the ICTR, states such as Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland
(all more than willing to comply with the requests of the international tribunals), required
national legislation implementing the respective establishing United Nations Security Council
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resolutions before they were able to comply with the tribunals’ requests under their national
constitutions.140
B. NON-COMPLIANCE BY LEBANON MAY INHIBIT THE EXERCISE OF
JURISDICTION
Maintaining vertical cooperation with Lebanon is essential to securing jurisdiction over
the perpetrators of the Hariri attacks and other potentially related incidents. As Lebanese
cooperation with the STL has been “most forthcoming and effective” and Lebanon bears 49% of
the STL’s operating costs, it appears very unlikely that Lebanese judicial authorities will
suddenly change course and cease to cooperate with the STL’s requests or deferral orders.141
Furthermore, as the Lebanese judge complied with the Deferral Order of March 27, 2009,
Lebanese judicial authorities seem cognizant of their duties to comply with such orders from the
STL.142 In the event that Lebanese authorities do refuse to comply with a deferral order or
request, the matter may be referred to the President of the Tribunal who may undertake steps to
secure compliance or report the issue to the United Nations Security Council.143 However, as
demonstrated in Prosecutor v. Mrksic, despite such reports, a lack of political will in the United
Nations Security Council could still inhibit the issuance of a binding resolution on the matter.144
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C. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER AN ISOLATED EVENT OR INCIDENT MAY
INHIBIT PROSECUTORIAL ABILITIES OF LEBANESE AUTHORITIES
While exclusive jurisdiction ensures the Prosecutor of the STL can maintain primacy
with respect to the Hariri case, there are policy considerations the Office of the Prosecutor of the
STL should bear in mind. For example, as was the case with the Macedonia deferrals, granting a
deferral order over attacks related to the Hariri assassination could inhibit the ability of Lebanese
authorities to prosecute such a case later on.145 In the event the STL wishes to refer cases back
to the Lebanese courts, there may be significant practical difficulties if the Prosecutor does not
provide the Lebanese authorities with a record of his investigations or conduct his investigations
in harmony with Lebanese law.146
If the STL wishes to preserve the ability to refer cases back to the Lebanese courts, one
option in subsequent deferral hearings could be to implement a similar procedural mechanism to
that used in the “Mavrovo Road Workers” case, requiring a new hearing to verify that the
exclusivity of jurisdiction is justified.147 Eventually this may require the STL to consider
adopting a rule similar to Rule 11 bis of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as the
current STL Statute does not contain such a procedural mechanism.148
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D. NON BIS IN IDEM MAY LIMIT JURISDICTION AND SERVE AS AN ARGUMENT
FOR DEFERRAL OF RELATED INCIDENTS
1. NON BIS IN IDEM AS A LIMITATION
Like the other international tribunals, the STL also has a non bis in idem provision which
could act as a limit to the scope of the STL’s jurisdiction over the national courts.149 Under
Article 5 of the STL Statute, a person already tried by national authorities may only subsequently
be tried by the STL if: 1) the national proceedings lacked impartiality or independence, 2) were
intended to shield the accused from the STL’s jurisdiction, or 3) the case was not diligently
prosecuted.150 Proving one of these exceptions to the non bis in idem provision is extremely
unusual.151
As the STL is to apply Lebanese law, it would be quite difficult (if not impossible) for the
Lebanese authorities to be able to prosecute and bring to trial an accused for a crime related to
the Hariri assassination that would not fall within the STL’s exclusive jurisdiction. For example,
if Lebanese authorities refused to comply with the March 27, 2009 Deferral Order issued by the
STL and charged and convicted an accused for a less serious crime in an effort to circumvent the
STL’s jurisdiction, this would provide strong evidence of an attempt to shield the accused from
prosecution. This was precisely what the ICTY implied in Prosecutor v. Mrksic, et.al, as it held:
The continuing refusal of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) to surrender the said accused indicates that the proceedings initiated
in its territory would be neither impartial nor independent and would be designed
to shield the accused from his international criminal responsibility.152
149
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Thus, while it may not be the norm, it does not seem that overcoming the non bis in idem
provision would create a significant obstacle for the STL Prosecutor should Lebanon carry a case
to trial relating to the assassination of Rafiq Hariri.
While this particular problem is avoided with respect to Lebanon, non bis in idem
presents a more substantial dilemma with respect to third party states, as the STL lacks primacy
over third party states which may attempt to prosecute.153 As the STL lacks the same
mechanisms for ensuring cooperation and primacy over third parties, hostile states such as Syria
may prefer to exercise their jurisdiction, to the preclusion of the STL.154 In the event such a state
ignored a deferral order issued by the STL and prosecuted, leading to an acquittal or conviction
of a lesser crime, it may not be possible for the STL to obtain jurisdiction without the issuance of
a UN Security Council Resolution.155
The STL is further limited in this respect because even if the Lebanese authorities
(which lack jurisdiction over the Hariri case) wished to assist the STL in its prosecutorial efforts,
Lebanon could not request assistance from a third party state. For example, as one scholar notes:
Once the STL has decided to investigate certain events and to prosecute certain
accused, the Lebanese courts are prevented from exercising their jurisdiction over
the same offences and the same persons. As a consequence, the competent
Lebanese authorities can no longer request the assistance of other states in these
matters; to request international assistance presupposes jurisdiction over the
offences with regard to which assistance is requested.156
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As a result, it appears the prospects for international cooperation between Lebanon and other
states have been somewhat narrowed.157
2. NON BIS IN IDEM AS AN ARGUMENT FOR DEFERRAL OF RELATED INCIDENTS
While the STL’s jurisdiction over the Hariri case is exclusive, in the event that Lebanon
or another state attempts to prosecute and bring to trial an accused for related crimes falling
within the jurisdiction of the STL, the Prosecutor should motion for a deferral order under Rule
17(E) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence in order to maintain primacy and extend exclusive
jurisdiction over such a case. Several arguments can be made for such a deferral order to help
ensure the STL’s jurisdiction.
Drawing upon the experience of the ICTR, this conflict of overlapping jurisdiction would
require the Prosecutor to demonstrate: 1) that proceedings have been initiated by national
authorities for crimes within the STL’s jurisdiction, 2) an investigation of the alleged crimes
within the STL’s jurisdiction are in fact simultaneously being undertaken by the national
authorities, and 3) that these investigations or criminal proceedings are closely related to, or
otherwise involve factual or legal questions which may have implications for the Prosecutor’s
investigations or prosecutions.158 So long as these elements can be demonstrated, it is likely that
a deferral order would be granted by the Pre-Trial Judge. As in Bagosora, Musema, and Radio
Television Mille Collines, arguments that the lives of witnesses would be endangered,
simultaneous investigations would frustrate the process of collecting testimony and create
confusion, and that the non bis in idem provision could bar subsequent prosecution by the STL
could all be advanced as additional support in an argument for a deferral order over a crime
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related to Hariri’s assassination.159 Issuing a second deferral order over a related attack or
accused in this manner would allow the STL to maintain primacy of jurisdiction over such a
case, as the Lebanese authorities would then fall under a legal duty to comply. Though
noncompliance by either Lebanon or another state’s national authorities with such an order could
still present an obstacle, the deferral order itself creates an international diplomatic pressure to
comply, which may be supplemented with a United Nations Security Council resolution if
necessary.
VII. CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by the experience of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, concurrent
jurisdiction and primacy necessitate a commitment by the national authorities to a system of
vertical cooperation. This requirement will naturally be imparted upon the STL and national
authorities. As this memorandum has established, a deferral order issued by an international
tribunal is in and of itself an exercise of primacy over investigation and prosecution. Subsequent
compliance by national authorities with such orders and requests submits the case to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the international tribunal, so that the investigation and trial of the
accused may proceed uninhibited.
While state sovereignty may present an obstacle to an exercise of primacy of jurisdiction,
Lebanon entered a legally binding agreement with the United Nations Security Council, under
which it voluntarily requested the creation of a tribunal and through which the exercise of
Chapter VII authority obligates it to comply with the deferral orders and requests of the STL.
Lebanese cooperation to date has been successful, and it does not seem likely that the Lebanese
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authorities will refuse to comply in the near future. In the event that they do refuse to comply,
procedural mechanisms for referral to the Security Council allow the STL to secure jurisdiction.
Though a deferral order grants exclusive jurisdiction to the STL, this may inhibit the
ability of Lebanese authorities to prosecute a case at a later time. The STL may amend its Rules
of Procedure and Evidence to include a rule similar to Rule 11 bis of the ICTY to enable this
possibility. In the meantime, continuing to maintain the vertical cooperation scheme and
keeping Lebanese authorities involved and apprised of the cases before the STL will protect this
possibility as well.
While the non bis in idem provision could inhibit the STL’s exercise of jurisdiction, the
STL can issue deferral orders before an accused is brought to trial to help ensure its exclusive
jurisdiction. In the event that Lebanese or third party states’ authorities refuse to cooperate and
defy such deferral orders, overcoming the non bis in idem provision is possible. Non bis in idem
can also be used as a tool by the Prosecutor to argue in favor of deferral for crimes related to the
assassination of Rafiq Hariri. However, this could produce the undesirable effect of precluding
Lebanon from engaging in negotiation to secure jurisdiction. The most significant obstacle the
STL will face in this respect is therefore securing jurisdiction over third party states, which do
not have a binding legal obligation to comply with the STL’s orders and requests, unless they
have implemented domestic legislation. This would allow hostile states such as Syria to prevent
the STL from exercising jurisdiction, as they are unlikely to implement such legislation.
In conclusion, while the STL has primacy over the national courts of Lebanon, its lack of
procedural tools for ensuring third party states’ compliance with its orders and requests is likely
to serve as the largest limitation on its exercise of jurisdiction over defendants.
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